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ABSTRACTS
Federal Courts-Diversity of Citizenship-
Corporation's Principal Place of Business
Appellants, citizens of Pennsylvania, brought an action in
federal district court alleging jurisdiction under diversity of citizen-
ship. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c) (Supp. 1960). Appellants alleged
D corporation had its principal place of business in New York
and thus had citizenship diverse to that of appellants. The district
court held that D's principal place of business was in Pennsylvania
and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Held, affirmed. While pro-
fessedly rejecting the test that the principal place of business should
be where the "nerve center" of the corporation is, the court de-
clared the determinative factor to be the place where control over
conduct of the business originates. Since the Operation Policy Com-
mittee, which conducts the corporate business and makes policy
decisions, has its headquarters in Pennsylvania, as do the vice
presidents in charge of the seven branches of the corporation, D
corporation is, under the statute, a citizen of Pennsylvania. Kelly v.
United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
The instant case is the first construction of "principal place
of business" by a circuit court of appeals. Earlier, in Scot Type-
writer Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D. N.Y.
1959), the district court found a corporation's principal place of
business to be its "nerve center"-the one place from which its
officers direct and control all corporate activities. This decision
was followed in two subsequent cases decided by the same court.
Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. v. Sipos, 184 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. N.Y.
1960); Hughes v. United Eng'rs. & Constructors, Inc., 178 F. Supp.
895 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See Comment, 62 W. VA. L. REV. 405
(1960).
Although in the instant case the term "nerve center" was
found to be a "pleasant and alluring figure of speech" even though
not helpful, a comparison of the Scot Typewriter and Kelly cases,
supra, would seem to indicate that the same test was in fact ap-
plied by the court of appeals in the instant case. In each instance
a major factor in determining the principal place of business was
the place from which the control over corporate affairs emanated.
1961 ]
1
Hook: Abstracts of Recent Cases
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1961
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Torts-Care Required of Driver Attempting to Pass
Another Vehicle
P, a guest in a car driven by D, brought this action to recover
for injuries sustained by P when D, in attempting to pass another
car, ran off the highway and into a ravine. D contended that he
was confronted with a sudden emergency when the car he was
attempting to pass suddenly swerved in front of him. Held, in re-
versing the judgment for P, the giving of an instruction requiring
the driver of an overtaking car to exercise a high degree of care
is reversible error. Overton v. Fields, 117 S.E.2d 598 (W. Va.
1960).
In holding that the driver of an overtaking car is only required
to exercise ordinary care in the attendant circumstances, the court
expressly overruled point 1 of the syllabus in Haffner v. Cross,
116 W. Va. 562, 182 S.E. 573 (1935), which required the exercise of
a high degree of care in such situations. A Virginia statute re-
quires the driver of an overtaking car to be certain that he can
pass in safety. VA. CODE ANN. tit. 46.1, § 212(a) (1958). The
Virginia court, in interpreting an earlier identical statute, stated
that this provision "makes statutory the normal requirement that
ordinary and reasonable care should be exercised" when attempting
to pass another vehicle. Simmons v. Craig, 199 Va. 338, 99 S.E.2d
641 (1957). The decision in the instant case not only puts West
Virginia in accord with the Virginia view, but also with the general
rule requiring the driver of an automobile attempting to pass an-
other car moving in the same direction to use ordinary care in so
doing. 5A AM. JuR. Automobiles & Highway Traffic § 352 (1956);
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326 (1949).
Torts-Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
P instituted this action for the wrongful death of her husband,
who was struck by D's car while crossing a four lane highway. D,
who had an unobstructed view for several hundred feet, and who
had entered the inside westbound lane in a no passing zone, struck
the decedent when he was three-fourths of the way across the west-
bound lanes. At the conclusion of P's evidence the trial court di-
rected a verdict for D. Held, reversed. Whether decedent negligently
placed himself in a position of danger, and whether D was negligent
in crossing a double white line, were questions for the jury. And
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even if decedent was negligent, recovery would not be barred, if
D by the exercise of reasonable care could have avoided striking
him. Stamper v. Bannister, 118 S.E.2d 313 (W. Va. 1961).
The court, while speaking in terms of the last clear chance
doctrine and citing cases which have applied the doctrine, does
not explicitly mention or discuss the doctrine, although it may
very well be applicable to the fact situation presented by the instant
case.
The doctrine may be invoked where (1) the plaintiff has
negligently placed himself in an imminently dangerous position,
and (2) he is either oblivious of the impending danger or unable
to escape therefrom, and (3) there was a sufficient interval of
time in which the defendant through the exercise of due care could
have avoided the situation, either after discovering it, or by the
exercise of due care could have discovered it. Donley, Observa-
tions on Last Clear Chance in West Virginia, 37 W. VA. L. Q. 362
(1931). See generally, RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 479, 480 (1934).
In his extensive article examining the doctrine and its application
by the West Virginia court, Professor Donley considers the ap-
plicability of the doctrine to varying situations. While the doctrine
is applicable to fact situations containing the three elements listed
above, other situations presenting slightly different circumstances
do not properly invoke the doctrine.
The court in the instant case stated that recovery would not
be barred if the defendant could have avoided the accident through
the use of reasonable care. This is an incorrect statement of the
doctrine in that it fails to take into account the second element
set forth above. For if the defendant did not actually discover
the decedent's perilous position, and if the decedent was aware
of his perilous situation and was able to escape therefrom, recovery
would be barred. Barr v. Curry, 137 W. Va. 364, 71 S.E.2d 313
(1952). It has been urged that the doctrine is inapplicable in
other situations also. See Donley, supra at 374, 384.
Unquestionably, the court could have discussed the doctrine
in a more enlightening manner. In 1942, in a corollary to his
earlier article, Judge Donley concluded that the failure of the court
to adopt a precise statement of the doctrine had resulted in con-
siderable misinterpretation of the doctrine by the trial courts. Don-
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ley, Last Clear Chance-Some Further Observations, 49 W. VA.
L. Q. 51, 58 (1942). Although some nineteen years have passed,
this conclusion still seems particularly apropos.
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